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Today’s Congress appears to be far from the kind of robust institution that the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution feared when they characterized the legislature
as the most dangerous branch of government.1 Political polarization and gridlock
have hampered Congress’s ability to act and undoubtedly contributed to the fact
that today’s worries about the concentration and abuse of federal power usually
center on the executive branch.2 Legal scholar Bruce Ackerman, for example, has
decried how modern circumstances have “transformed the executive branch into a
serious threat to our constitutional tradition.”3 Arguing that executive power
threatens American democratic governance, scholar Peter Shane has plainly
declared that “the President is the most dangerous branch.”4
Such claims of excessive executive power call to mind historical examples
of forceful exertions of presidential authority, such as when President Truman
asserted inherent executive authority to seize and run the nation’s steel mills,
a move the Supreme Court famously blocked in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer.5 But present-day concerns over executive power have emerged as
more than a matter of historical interest. Contemporary scholarly voices of
alarm join with those of political leaders from both the right and the left who,
not surprisingly, in their turn deplore exercises of executive authority by
administrations of their opposing parties.6 Democrats have resoundingly
criticized President George W. Bush and his Administration’s invocation of the
unitary executive theory, while Republican members of Congress have taken

1 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all
power into its impetuous vortex. . . . [I]t is against the enterprising ambition of this department
that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.”). This fear of
legislative tyranny explains why the Constitution divided the Congress into two houses, each of
which must consent before any bill can become law.
2 Such alarm is, of course, hardly new. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY viii (1973) (describing an increasing “conception of presidential power so spacious and
peremptory as to imply a radical transformation of the traditional polity” and arguing that “[t]he
constitutional Presidency . . . has become the imperial Presidency”).
3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 4 (2010).
4 PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 18-21 (2009). Ackerman and Shane are not alone in this regard. For
examples of similar arguments, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725,
1821 (1996), claiming that “the executive branch long ago supplanted its legislative counterpart as the
most powerful—and therefore most dangerous—in the sense that the Founders meant,” and Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217,
223 (1994), asserting that “[t]ruly, the executive—the Presidency—is the most dangerous branch.”
5 See 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several
constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President.”).
6 See Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate over Law or Politics?,
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 638 (2010) (noting that “Democrats can be expected to be more critical of
the exercise of presidential power by Republican Presidents, and vice versa”).
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to criticizing—even suing—the Obama Administration over executive
initiatives on policies as varied as health care, immigration, and gun control.7
Although fierce, many recent legal controversies over executive power
have involved what remains, at least to the larger public, a relatively obscure
aspect of government: namely, the implementation of domestic policies by
the many cabinet departments and other administrative agencies that carry out
governmental functions on a day-to-day basis. This vast apparatus of the
regulatory state, centered within the executive branch, has grown dramatically
since the founding of the United States. Although less visible to most
Americans than other governmental institutions like Congress or the
presidency, federal departments and agencies wield power over vast segments
of the economy, affecting almost every important facet of contemporary life.
What actions these domestic agencies take and how they make their decisions
matter greatly, making the discretion exercised by these administrative
institutions a proper matter for both investigation and concern.
Not only do contemporary controversies revolve around the day-to-day
operation of the regulatory state, but they also increasingly involve still subtler
exercises of executive discretion than (merely) deciding what policies to adopt or
actions to take. Several important controversies in recent years center not so much
on executive action at all—as was the case with Truman’s attempt to seize control
of steel mills—but rather on the strategic deployment of executive inaction. When
the Obama Administration announced in 2013 that it was effectively extending
certain compliance deadlines under the Affordable Care Act, it did so by declaring
that it would refrain from taking enforcement actions for the period of the
extension.8 Similarly, when President Barack Obama announced a major
immigration reform initiative in 2014, the centerpiece of that reform package was
7 See, e.g., Ashley Parker, ‘Imperial Presidency’ Becomes a Rallying Cry for Republicans, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/us/politics/imperial-presidency-becomes-republicansrallying-slogan.html [https://perma.cc/FN73-DJCZ] (observing that Republicans have called President
Obama an imperial President, “encapsulat[ing] their criticisms about government overreach” due to the
President’s policy initiatives). Contrasting assessments by U.S. Senators from different parties are illustrative.
Compare Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator, Warning Against the Bush Administration’s Efforts to Vastly
Expand Executive Power (May 30, 2006), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2006/5/5b39
1b57-7e9c-9af9-72a8-c4f965f0a085-post [https://perma.cc/XFM3-JWCD] (“[The Bush] Administration
has, in my view, implemented a multi-pronged, ongoing effort to concentrate power under the Executive
- contrary to our constitutional framework . . . .”), with Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented
Lawlessness, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 99 (2015) (“There is no basis in history for [President Obama’s]
sweeping view of executive power.”).
8 See Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Ins. Comm’rs. (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.cms.gov
/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/Downloads/commissioner-letter-11-14-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9XL-XZ
QW] (“Under this transitional policy, health insurance coverage in the individual or small group market that
is renewed for a policy year starting between January 1, 2014, and October 1, 2014, and associated group
health plans of small businesses, will not be considered to be out of compliance with the market reforms
specified below under the conditions specified below.”).
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the Administration’s stated commitment not to enforce immigration laws against
certain undocumented immigrants whose children are U.S. citizens or legal
permanent residents.9 In both of these instances, the Obama Administration
justified its policy choices at least in part on executive discretion not to pursue
certain enforcement actions.10
It has long been accepted that, absent any express statutory restriction to
the contrary, the executive branch possesses broad discretion over which cases
it prosecutes and which ones it does not.11 Legal restrictions on executive
authority have typically applied only after the executive branch has decided
to act, not before it acts. Before any final action occurs, the executive branch
possesses what the Supreme Court has recognized as an “absolute discretion,”
at least when it comes to enforcement.12 Yet today, the absoluteness of that
discretion is being put up for debate. As Presidents and their appointees
increasingly find more creative ways to achieve substantive policy results
through what have previously been considered completely discretionary
means, it becomes understandable that scholars, governmental leaders, and
9 See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Immigration
Accountability Executive Action (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20
/fact-sheet-immigration-accountability-executive-action [https://perma.cc/3VJ5-YTR7] (“DHS will also
create a new deferred action program for people who are parents of U.S. Citizens or Lawful Permanent
Residents (LPRs) and have lived in the United States for five years or longer if they register, pass a
background check and pay taxes.”).
10 On the ACA, see Greg Sargent, White House Defends Legality of Obamacare Fix, WASH.
POST: PLUM LINE (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013
/11/14/white-house-defends-legality-of-obamacare-fix [https://perma.cc/P82F-3QAU], which quoted
the Obama Administration’s response that “[t]he Supreme Court held more than 25 years ago that
agencies charged with administering statues [sic] have inherent authority to exercise discretion to
ensure that their statutes are enforced in a manner that achieves statutory goals and are consistent with
other administrative policies.” On immigration, see Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.,
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil Kerlikowske,
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files
/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4858-KALY], which stated that
“[d]eferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion by which the Secretary deprioritizes an
individual’s case for humanitarian reasons, administrative convenience, or in the interest of the
Department’s overall enforcement mission.”
11 On occasion, Presidents have even challenged provisions of statutes mandating enforcement as
unconstitutional infringements on their enforcement discretion. See Statement on Signing the
Immigration Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1717, 1718 (Nov. 29, 1990) (“I do not interpret this provision
[on “temporary protected status”] as detracting from any authority of the executive branch to exercise
prosecutorial discretion in suitable immigration cases. Any attempt to do so would raise serious
constitutional questions.”); Statement on Signing the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986,
1 PUB. PAPERS 802, 803 (June 19, 1986) (“The principle of prosecutorial discretion is an essential
ingredient in the execution of the laws. I believe that the Congress cannot bind the Executive in advance
and remove all prosecutorial discretion without infringing on the powers of the Executive.”).
12 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has recognized on several
occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through
civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”).
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the public are beginning to wonder about whether there should be any limits
on this approach to the exercise of executive power. It was not very surprising
that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a district court
injunction blocking the Obama Administration’s immigration policy.13 But it
was telling that the Court, on its own accord, added to the questions raised
by the parties a constitutional question involving the duty of a President to
take care that federal laws are faithfully executed.14
Although the Court ultimately declined to answer any of the questions raised
in that case,15 the central question remains: what are the proper bounds of
executive discretion in the regulatory state, especially over administrative
decisions not to take enforcement actions? This question, which, just by asking
it, would seem to cast into some doubt the seemingly absolute discretion the
executive branch has until now been thought to possess, has become the focal
point of the latest debate to emerge over the U.S. Constitution’s separation of
powers. That ever-growing, heated debate is what motivated more than two
dozen distinguished scholars to gather for a two-day conference held late last year
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, a conference organized around the
papers appearing in this special Issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review. We are pleased to introduce this insightful collection of scholarship by
explicating the conceptual contours underlying the contemporary debate over
executive discretion, and its bounds, in the regulatory state.
I. THE FACES OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
To begin to understand how executive discretion is or should be bounded, it
helps to define what “executive discretion” means. We take “discretion” plainly to
mean the unconstrained exercise of governmental power. We take “executive” to
encompass not only the President but also the White House staff as well as the
appointees and other officers who serve within the administrative agencies that
carry out the laws adopted by Congress. To ask about the bounds of executive
discretion, then, is to ask about how much unconstrained power the President and
administrative officials should possess. In this introductory Article, we do not offer
answers to that question, for, broadly speaking, that question is what the articles
that follow in this Symposium seek to address. Here, we simply note that what
bounds are, or should be, placed on executive discretion will likely depend on the
type of power under consideration.
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016).
See id. (“In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the parties are directed to
brief and argue the following question: ‘Whether the Guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the
Constitution, Art. II, § 3.’”).
15 The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision in a per curiam ruling with an evenly split
Court. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
13
14
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A. Three Faces of Executive Power
Political scientists have long grappled with the meaning of power, and, over
forty years ago, political theorist Steven Lukes offered a significant advance by
articulating what have come to be known as the three faces of power.16 Greatly
simplifying, these three faces comprise the powers to make decisions, set agendas,
and shape preferences.17 Lukes’s framework conceptualizes power within any
social and political arena, including government.
Without denying the value of Lukes’s framework as a matter of sociology,
we think that, from the standpoint of constitutional and administrative law,
it is helpful to recognize three slightly different ways of conceiving of the
faces of executive power: the power to command, persuade, and defer. These
three faces of executive power are not incompatible with Lukes’s framework,
but they serve to illuminate key questions about how (or by how much) each
type of executive power should be constrained by law.
The first face of executive power is the power to command. For most
readers, this will be the kind of power that most naturally springs to mind
when thinking about executive discretion. It is also very closely related to
Lukes’s first face of power of decisionmaking. The power to command is the
power, as political scientist Robert Dahl once wrote, to compel people to do
what they “would not otherwise do.”18 Truman’s executive order seeking to
seize control of the nation’s steel mills is a paradigmatic example of the power
to command. It is a power that compels action, invoked any time government
adopts an order or a rule.19
Well-accepted principles of U.S. constitutional and administrative law treat
this type of power most suspiciously, making it more likely to be subject to
judicial review than any other type of executive power. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,20 blocking President
Truman’s steel seizure order, makes plain that presidential action of this first
type must be grounded in law and will be scrutinized by the courts. As Justice
Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown makes clear, when a
President acts in contravention of a statute, “his power is at its lowest ebb.”21
Likewise, when an administrative agency exercises its power to command,
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) affords anyone adversely affected an

See generally STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974).
Id. at 32.
Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 202-03 (1957).
See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012) (defining “agency action”
to mean the adoption of a “rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent”).
20 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
21 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
16
17
18
19
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opportunity to seek judicial review of the agency’s action.22 The courts can hold
invalid agency actions that offend constitutional or statutory requirements, fail to
derive from proper procedure, or are determined to be “arbitrary” or “capricious.”23
The second face of executive power is the power to persuade. Chief Justice
John Roberts had this type of power in mind when, writing in his majority
opinion in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, he
castigated Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissenting opinion for essentially
relegating the President to a position of “cajoler-in-chief.”24 But at least as far
back as the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, with his popularization of the
bully pulpit, the President’s power to cajole has been well-established and
acknowledged to be influential. As a matter of real impact, persuasion may
well be the President’s most important, if not only, real source of power for
most purposes. Political scientist Richard Neustadt thought as much, defining
presidential power explicitly in terms of the power of persuasion.25 Although
Chief Justice Roberts seemed to suggest that cajoling diminished the office
of the presidency, Presidents actually have a distinctive capacity to persuade
others, particularly when it comes to what issues should be on the broader
policy agenda. As political scientist John Kingdon has noted, “[T]he president
can single-handedly set the agendas, not only of people in the executive branch,
but also of people in Congress and outside the government.”26 Despite this
substantial and practically important type of power, the power to persuade,
unlike the power to command, is not constrained by law in any meaningful way.27
22 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . is
entitled to judicial review thereof.”).
23 Id. § 706.
24 561 U.S. 477, 501-02 (2010).
25 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 30 (Free
Press 1991) (1960). Joining him in this view is political scientist Clinton Rossiter, who recognized, though, that
persuasion is not always easy, even for a President. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
41 (1956) (positing that the President’s most difficult challenge stems from the need “to persuade the pertinent
bureau or agency—even when headed by men of his own choosing—to follow his direction faithfully”).
26 JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 23 (updated 2d
ed. 2011). For a discussion of presidential influence over the rulemaking agendas at administrative
agencies, see Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory and
Evidence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 93 (2016).
27 We recognize, of course, that regulatory agencies can try to use the power to persuade as a
strategy for shaping behavior and will be subject to legal constraints when they do so. See, e.g.,
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 255 (2008) (making a case for the use of “the
gentle nudge” as a means of accomplishing regulatory goals). Whether in adopting default rules or
information disclosure regulations, agencies are still actually exercising a power to command
regulated entities to act in certain ways; they are just, for example, requiring these entities to disclose
information with the aim of activating third parties who will persuade the disclosers to change other
behavior. See id. at 190-92 (describing a requirement that companies disclose their releases of toxic
chemicals, creating “bad publicity” that motivates companies to reduce their pollution). As such, regulatory
nudges will be constrained in much the same way as other regulatory commands. They must be consistent
with legal authority, promulgated through proper procedure, and grounded in sound policy reasoning.
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The third face of executive power is the power to defer. This type of power
involves the use of inaction as a lever to achieve policy outcomes. It is this
face of power that underlies several of the most recent controversies over
executive power. When the Obama Administration announced that it would
not enforce certain employer deadlines in the Affordable Care Act, and when
it announced that it would refrain from taking immigration action against
certain undocumented immigrants, it asserted its power to defer.28 Although
these current uses of the power to defer have stirred much controversy, the
governmental power to defer has been around for a long time and is especially
prevalent in the context of law’s enforcement.29 Prosecutorial discretion is a
paradigmatic example. The power lies not merely in prosecutors’ freedom to
defer pressing charges, but also in the way that discretion affords prosecutors
considerable influence over defendants. By using their discretion over what
charges to file as a bargaining chip, prosecutors can lead many defendants to
waive their right to a jury trial and plead guilty.
In the regulatory state, an administrative agency’s power to defer can
sometimes have a similar “bargaining chip” effect. By steering enforcement
resources toward certain kinds of behavior and away from others, agencies
have sometimes tried to use their power to defer in an attempt to shape
private conduct. In the 1990s, for example, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) announced a policy according to which the
Agency would allow regulated firms to “choose” the level of scrutiny that
OSHA would apply to them.30 If a company cooperated and put in place a
health and safety management system (which was not something required by
law), OSHA would place the company on a low-priority status for
inspection.31 If a company did not cooperate by putting in place OSHA’s
See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
It is not only present in the enforcement context, of course. When a statute delegates broad
rulemaking authority but offers little direction as to when or how an agency must use that
rulemaking authority, the agency will also be able to exercise its power to defer. It should also be
acknowledged that other branches of government have the power to defer, as well. The Supreme
Court, for example, can defer granting petitions for certiorari on important issues until the Justices
believe they have a case that frames issues productively. See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO
DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 236 (1991) (“When assessing
whether or not a case is a good vehicle, the decision must be made in terms of ‘is a better case likely?’”).
30 See Occupational Safety and Health Administration Directive CPL 02-00-119, OSHA High
Injury/Illness Rate Targeting and Cooperative Compliance Programs (Dep’t of Labor 1997),
https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_id=1516&p_table=DIRECTIVES
[https://perma.cc/PX9L-VZ8V] [hereinafter “OSHA Directive”] (detailing the agency’s “Cooperative
Compliance Program” under which facilities that “choose to participate” will be placed on secondary or
tertiary inspection lists that reduce their chances of inspection by at least seventy to ninety percent). For
further background on this “choose your OSHA” approach, see John D. Donahue, The Unaccustomed
Inventiveness of the Labor Department, in INNOVATIONS IN GOVERNMENT: RESEARCH, RECOGNITION,
AND REPLICATION 93, 96 (Sandford Borins ed., 2008).
31 OSHA Directive, supra note 30.
28
29
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desired management system, then the Agency assured the company of a high
likelihood of receiving an inspection, and presumably a very rigorous one at
that.32 OSHA claimed merely to be exercising its power to defer, its discretion
over when and who to inspect, but a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit rejected that position.33 According to the court, OSHA’s policy
was more than just an internal “inspection plan”; it actually amounted to a new
regulation, and thus the agency needed to go through a full notice-andcomment rulemaking procedure.34
Although the court rejected OSHA’s attempt to use its power to defer to
achieve the Agency’s strategic goals, in most circumstances agency decisions
to defer on inspections or enforcement actions have been left entirely
unconstrained. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court rejected a statutory
challenge to the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) decision to decline
to take enforcement action against state correctional facilities that were
administering the death penalty through lethal injection.35 The federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) gives the FDA the authority to enforce its
many provisions, which include a requirement that drugs be approved as “safe
and effective” before they can be lawfully administered.36 Even though it
seemed facially obvious that the use of drugs for lethal injections violated the
FDCA, the Court refused to order the FDA to take any enforcement action
against the states. The Court held that, in cases of agency “[r]efusals to take
enforcement steps,” “the presumption is that judicial review is not
available.”37 The Court reasoned that setting enforcement priorities were
policy choices, not legal ones:
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of
a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency
must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency
resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is
likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested
best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has
enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act
against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The

Id.
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 211-13 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 212-13.
470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985).
Id. at 824.
Id. at 831. The Court noted that the APA, 5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2), does not afford judicial review
to actions that are “committed to agency discretion” by law. Id. at 832.
32
33
34
35
36
37
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agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables
involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.38

Furthermore, the Court noted that decisions not to act do not usually amount
to an exertion of “coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property
rights,” which would present the kinds of issues that courts typically seek to
protect.39
Although the Heckler Court unanimously concluded that the APA did not
authorize the courts to compel FDA enforcement, it did acknowledge that
agencies cannot decline to take enforcement actions if doing so would
contravene statutory guidelines. “Congress may limit an agency’s exercise of
enforcement power if it wishes,” the Court noted, “either by setting
substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to
discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.”40 Furthermore, as Cass
Sunstein has argued, it appears that Heckler “does not authorize the executive
to fail to enforce those laws of which it disapproves.”41 But exactly how to
determine whether decisions to defer are based on mere disapproval will not
always be clear, something even Sunstein has acknowledged.42 At present, what
does seem quite clear is that Heckler gives government agencies a strong
presumption of absolute discretion whenever they exercise their power to defer.
Looking across all three faces of executive power—command, persuade,
and defer—it is possible to say that these powers correspond to three degrees
or levels of legal constraint. The power to command faces the greatest
constraint and oversight by the courts. Youngstown teaches that when
commanding, the President must possess authority to do so and must not act
in opposition to legislative principles. The APA makes plain that when
agencies issue orders or rules, those who are adversely affected by them may
seek to review the substantive and procedural legality of those actions. By
contrast, the power to persuade faces the least amount of constraint—basically
none at all. Somewhere in between, but usually close to the “no constraint
whatsoever” end of the spectrum, lies the power to defer, at least absent any
specific guidelines for action contained within an applicable statute.

Id. at 831-32.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 833.
Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
653, 670 (1985).
42 Id. at 672-73.
38
39
40
41
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B. Executive Discretion: Presidential and Administrative
Just as distinguishing the three faces of executive power helps to clarify the
bounds of executive discretion in the regulatory state, it can also prove helpful
to distinguish between two main components of “executive” in the concept of
executive discretion: Presidents versus the administrators they appoint to head
administrative agencies. Obviously Presidents spring immediately to mind in
any consideration of executive power; after all, Article II of the Constitution
declares that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President.”43 Yet under
most statutes, Congress has delegated authority to administrators; they are the
officials granted the express powers to command or defer in ways that carry out
the aims and responsibilities contained in specific legislation. These powers,
exercised ultimately by administrators, are the ones that give rise to the kinds
of questions about the bounds of executive discretion that are addressed
throughout this Symposium.
Let us return to the example of the Department of Labor’s choose-your-OSHA
policy from the 1990s. That enforcement policy came about following a public
announcement by President William Clinton of a “New OSHA” initiative,
under which the agency would adopt smarter approaches to reducing
workplace injuries, including the choose-your-OSHA compliance policy.44
Vice President Albert Gore even presented OSHA with an award for a regional
prototype of the policy as part of a White House–driven initiative, called the
National Performance Review, which sought to encourage agencies to pursue
innovative regulatory strategies.45 Yet despite these White House efforts, the
policy was formally adopted by the Department of Labor, and it was the
Secretary of Labor who was named in the D.C. Circuit litigation over the policy.
For similar reasons, even though President Obama may have announced his
Administration’s actions to delay the compliance period for mandated health
insurance and to defer taking deportation actions against certain undocumented
immigrants, these actions were legally effectuated by the Administrators heading
the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Homeland Security,
respectively.
Distinguishing between the President, who possesses “the executive
power” under Article II, and a series of administrators, who are granted
delegated authority to act by statute, proves to be crucial to understanding

U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, OSHA Expands Cooperative Compliance Programs to
Reduce Injuries and Illnesses in the Workplace (Nov. 25, 1997), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp
.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=1075 [https://perma.cc/TJ4C-VVWS] (“CCPs are
part of the new, common-sense approach to OSHA announced by President Clinton in May 1995.”).
45 Id.
43
44
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the broader debate over the unitary executive.46 On the one hand, we can ask
whether the statutory grant of authority to a specific administrator implies
some limitation on presidential involvement in the actions undertaken by that
administrator. On the other hand, is a statutory grant to an administrator still
subject to the Constitution’s vesting of executive power in “a” President?
These questions have been debated throughout the nation’s history and
examined extensively in constitutional scholarship.47 We thus do little here
beyond noting these larger questions, although they do turn out to be relevant
to much of the discussion in this Symposium, even if they are only lurking in
the background at times. The key point for our purposes here is simply that
the statutorily authorized, as well as practically vital, role for administrators
in executive governance also helps to explain why so much constitutional law
involving the separation of powers has centered on the President’s
relationship to administrators, particularly with respect to the President’s
authority to appoint and remove those administrators.48
The distinction between Presidents and administrators also lies at the
heart of the Take Care Clause, which several of the contributors to this
Symposium analyze in detail. This clause may well constrain executive power
to defer, imposing an obligation to enforce laws “faithfully,” as perhaps hinted
by the Supreme Court when it added the Take Care Clause question to its
grant of review of the Obama Administration’s immigration deferred action
program.49 Without a doubt, the clause speaks to the President, imploring
that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”50 As Professor
Sunstein has written, this provision articulates a clear “duty” and “imposes
an obligation on the President.”51
But recognizing that the clause imposes some duty on the President does
not make clear what bounds might exist on executive discretion to defer.
Instead, it raises two further questions. First, what exactly is the duty
imposed by the clause? Surely it is not for the President directly to enforce

46 See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 3-4
(2008) (“[T]he theory of the unitary executive holds that the Vesting Clause of Article II . . . is a grant
to the president of all of the executive power, which includes the power to remove and direct all lowerlevel executive officials.”)
47 See id. at 3-21 (reviewing the debate in constitutional scholarship over the President’s authority
over subordinate executive officials). See generally id. (tracing historical claims surrounding Presidents’
assertion of authority over executive officials).
48 For seminal cases on the President’s relationship to agency administrators, see NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S.
477 (2010); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935); and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
49 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016).
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
51 Sunstein, supra note 41, at 670.
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the law, but rather, as the text of the provision makes plain, it is for the
President to see that the law is faithfully executed by others—namely, by the
administrators who are given statutory authority to implement and enforce.
Second, what duty, if any, does the clause impose on those administrators
themselves? The text of the Take Care Clause would seem plainly to impose
its obligation on the President, not on the administrators.
Yet can it really be the case that the President has a constitutional duty to
see that the laws are faithfully executed, but that administrators have no
similar constitutional obligation to execute laws, faithfully or otherwise?
Answering this question about the Take Care Clause brings us back to the
debate over the unitary executive theory.52 It also brings us back to the three
faces of executive power.53
Asking whether the Take Care Clause imposes obligations on
administrators, either directly or indirectly, contemplates a scenario much
like that raised by the Obama Administration’s deferred action immigration
plan, where an Administrator sought to exercise the power to defer.54
Admittedly, the President happened to agree with the Administrator—and,
in fact, the Administrator may even have been directed by the President to
implement the deferred action program. But for sake of analysis, let us vary
the scenario slightly to imagine a President who does not support an
administrator’s exercise of the power to defer. Does the President have the
power to command that the administrator no longer defer? If so, and if the
administrator has a duty to obey the President’s command, then the duty that
the Take Care Clause imposes on the President can effectively be transferred
to the administrator by the use of a presidential order.
Of course, some scholars will no doubt still be inclined to argue that the
President has no directive authority that can impose a duty to execute on the
administrator. Any such duty, they would argue, would need to be imposed
by Congress, especially given that the Supreme Court in Heckler has
acknowledged that Congress can impose that duty. As for the President, if
he possesses no directive authority over his administrators, then he must
seek to fulfill his constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully
executed by exercising his power to persuade, a power which presumably can
be made stronger by also making threats to exercise his authority to remove
a recalcitrant administrator.

52
53
54

See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 46.
See supra Section I.A.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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II. THE BOUNDS OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
Up to this point in this introduction, our aim has been to provide some
conceptual order to illuminate and organize the underlying legal issues
implicated by recent controversies over the use of executive power. We have
argued that any analysis of the bounds of executive discretion in the
regulatory state should begin by distinguishing between the type of executive
power exercised as well as the executive actor under scrutiny, the President
versus administrator. The discretion by an administrator not to act ought to
be distinguished from that same administrator’s discretion over what actions
to take—as well as from the discretion inherent in the President’s exercise of
executive power. With Heckler as the principal foundation, we have argued
that an administrator’s power to defer has virtually no legal bounds on it at
all—at least (a) without some statutory compulsion or guidelines, or (b)
absent (i) a relevant presidential order, and (ii) an obligation on the part of
the administrator to follow the President’s order.
As should be clear, this framework still leaves much to be worked out, not
the least of which will be some of the persistent points of debate over
separation-of-powers law, such as the question of an administrator’s duty to
obey presidential orders. Still, we offer the framework here to help clarify the
importance of the scholarship presented in this Symposium. Discerning the
bounds of executive discretion in the regulatory state, as we hope should by
now be evident, requires attention to the proper scope of executive power in
U.S. constitutional governance, consideration of special concerns about the
use of executive discretion to defer administrative action, and an assessment
of possible doctrinal and nondoctrinal bounds on that discretion to defer. In
this Section, we briefly introduce the articles that follow in this Symposium
and explain how they contribute to a better understanding of the vital issues
implicated by executive discretion and its limits.
A. The Scope of Executive Power
The first three articles in this Symposium examine a baseline question of
whether the executive branch wields too much power. In his article drawing
on his keynote address at the University of Pennsylvania Law School
conference, Professor Cass Sunstein argues that, when compared with the
legislative and judicial branches, the executive branch possesses a superior
ability to gather and process information.55 Drawing on a case study of a
Department of Transportation rule that requires automobile manufacturers
55 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1613 (2016)
(“With respect to the acquisition of information, the executive branch is usually in a far better
position than the legislative and judicial branches.”).
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to install backup cameras in cars, he contends that the power exercised by the
executive branch generally makes for better regulatory decisions. As a result,
Sunstein suggests that courts should keep from constraining executive discretion
too severely and even apply a more deferential standard of review when reviewing
agency interpretations of their own regulations.56
Professor Michael Gerhardt expresses some skepticism that the legislative
branch is as deficient as Sunstein argues; however, even accepting that the
executive branch has a greater informational advantage, Gerhardt calls attention
to what he considers an inherent tendency of the presidency to aggrandize its
powers, making it the branch most prone to “constitutional arrogance.”57
Gerhardt suggests that the legislative and judicial branches can check the
aggrandizement of presidential power to some extent, as can public opinion. But
he concludes with a degree of pessimism about the effectiveness of these checks—
particularly public opinion—especially when low-salience issues are involved.58
Professor Eric Posner suggests that framing the issue as one of striking
the proper balance between executive and legislative power focuses attention
on the wrong question.59 Posner argues that decisions about the propriety of
executive and legislative action should draw guidance from a more direct
analysis of the government’s optimal structure rather than a comparison of
the relative strength of the various branches.60 The question of how “much”
executive power should be constrained, in other words, cannot be answered
in the abstract. Similarly, given the dynamic interaction that necessarily exists
between the branches of government, it is difficult to forecast how any change
to a single structural rule will affect the relative power of any branch.
B. Executive Power to Defer
The next three articles analyze specific exercises of executive discretion: the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act; the Obama Administration’s
56 See id. at 1629 (“An appreciation of the epistemic advantages of the executive branch, and
the relevance of those advantages to the ascertainment of meaning in the face of genuine ambiguity,
strongly suggests that Auer is entirely right.”).
57 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Arrogance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2016)
(explaining that Presidents display “constitutional arrogance” by “using their unilateral powers to
break boundaries and displace other constitutional authorities”).
58 See id. at 1657, 1669 (observing that “it is common for Presidents to bypass Congress” and
that “[t]he courts generally—and the Supreme Court in particular—defer to administrative agencies
and uphold executive actions more often than not” (footnote omitted)).
59 Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Powers Arguments, the Structural Constitution, and the Problem of
Executive “Underenforcement,” 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (2016) (noting “the difficulty of defining
and measuring power, let alone determining whether the power of different branches ‘balances’”).
60 See id. at 1682 (positing that, instead of seeking to balance power between the Executive and
Congress, “[a] more promising approach is for the judicial department to address directly the social
costs and benefits of proposed changes to government structure that end up in court”).
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immigration reform; and the use of presidential signing statements. Each of
these examples focuses on the use of nonenforcement discretion—or the
power to defer—to achieve policy objectives.
Professor Nicholas Bagley discusses the Obama Administration’s use of
executive discretion in implementing the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
exhaustively assessing the legality of a variety of executive actions that have
generated criticism. Although he finds the Obama Administration mostly
acted lawfully in implementing the ACA, he does question the legality of the
Administration’s announcement that it would temporarily decline to enforce
certain statutory deadlines and would reallocate certain appropriations to
ensure the ACA could be rolled out.61 Bagley acknowledges that the
Administration may have thought these actions were justifiable as a matter of
policy or politics, but he warns that the long-term adverse consequences of
the steps the Administration took may outweigh the short-term benefits.62
Professor Patricia Bellia uses the Take Care Clause to analyze the Obama
Administration’s attempt to frame its decision not to enforce the immigration
laws against certain types of people as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.63
Bellia notes that the Take Care Clause cuts both ways in terms of discretion,
recognizing that Presidents possess discretion in how the law is enforced,
while simultaneously obligating them to execute the law in a faithful
manner.64 Her review of the existing judicial precedents, as well as the
opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel on the legality of the Obama
Administration’s immigration initiative, indicates that answers to the key
questions remain unsettled.65
Professor Christopher Yoo examines another form of executive discretion
that has proven increasingly controversial: the presidential signing

61 See Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 1715, 1721-25, 1729-35 (2016) (noting legal issues pertaining to “administrative delays” and “costsharing subsidies”).
62 See id. at 1746-47 (“The price of such self-help, however, is likely to be paid in the further
accretion of executive power, in the setting of precedents that make it easier for future Presidents
to sidestep legal constraints, and in the tit-for-tat escalation of interbranch conflict.”).
63 See Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753,
1756 (2016) (“This Article uses DAPA to explore the tension between the discretion-granting and
discretion-limiting features of the Faithful Execution Clause.”).
64 See id. (arguing that “the clause seemingly embeds some flexibility to decide when and how
to exercise that power,” but also that “the clause calls for the President not merely to ensure that the
laws be executed, but that they be ‘faithfully’ executed”).
65 See id. at 1791 (contending that “[t]he OLC framework appears to collapse [statutory and
constitutional] inquiries,” and that therefore its framework “may introduce too much elasticity into
the analysis”).
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statement.66 If viewed as a prospective statement of how a statute will and will
not be enforced, signing statements can be seen as a form of nonenforcement
discretion.67 Yoo argues that signing statements raising constitutional objections
are implicit both in Marbury v. Madison68 as well as in the longstanding tradition
of permitting Presidents not to defend the constitutionality of every statute.69
Signing statements about the interpretation of statutes, Yoo urges, should be
governed by an equal dignity principle, which holds that presidential and
congressional legislative history should receive equal treatment, either by
ignoring both or giving each equal weight.70
C. Assessing Possible Bounds
The articles in the final part of this Symposium offer careful consideration
of the potential bounds on executive discretion in the regulatory state.
Professors Jack Goldsmith and John Manning augment Professor Bellia’s
discussion of the ways that the Take Care Clause both recognizes and limits
presidential discretion by considering still three additional ways: supporting
the President’s power to remove subordinate executive officers; limiting courts’
authority to second-guess Presidents’ enforcement discretion; and serving as
the textual basis for what Henry Monaghan called the “protective power”71 (and
what Manning and Goldsmith have elsewhere called the “completion
power”72). Manning and Goldsmith argue that, to date, the courts have not

66 Christopher S. Yoo, Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1801, 1802-04 (2016) (observing that both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama
have been criticized for using signing statements).
67 See Developments in the Law—Presidential Authority, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2068, 2072, 2077 n.67
(2012) (explaining that signing statements have been used to advance various goals within the executive
branch, including “communicating (and at times expanding) presidential nonenforcement authority”).
68 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
69 See Yoo, supra note 66, at 1809-12 (exploring the sources that establish presidential “authority
and obligation” to evaluate the constitutionality of statutes).
70 See id. at 1823 (“Treating all three actors specified in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, with equal
dignity requires giving equal weight to their pronouncements of the meaning of a statute. The fact that
Presidents are essential actors in the legislative process provides strong reason to give as much weight
to their views of the meaning of a statute as to the views of the House or the Senate.”).
71 See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 61 (1993)
(describing the “protective” power of the Executive as the “power to preserve, protect, and defend the
personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the national government”).
72 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280,
2282 (2006) (defining “completion power” as “the President’s authority to prescribe incidental details
needed to carry into execution a legislative scheme, even in the absence of any congressional
authorization to complete that scheme”).
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recognized the tension between these purposes and consequently have yet to
provide any clear guidance as to the Take Care Clause’s meaning.73
Professor Cary Coglianese and Kristin Firth focus on the central
relationship embedded in the Take Care Clause, namely the relationship
between the President and the heads of administrative agencies.74 Starting
with the assumption that the ultimate actor in implementing domestic policy
is the agency head, they offer an analysis of possible constitutional constraints
on the President’s ability to direct the actions those officials take (including
strategic forms of inaction).75 Drawing on a series of original survey-based
experiments, they assess how different norms that might constrain presidential
involvement may affect public perceptions about the legitimacy of the law and
legal institutions. One such possible constraint would permit Presidents to
oversee agencies but not to make decisions for them.76 Coglianese and Firth
find that this loose formulation leads to a decline in public legitimacy relative
to a constraint based on a clear, bright-line test that demands that heads of
agencies formally sign off on agency action.77 They also find evidence
indicating that, regardless of whether the White House oversees or decides
administrative matters, Presidents stand to take the political blame for those
actions when something goes wrong.
Daniel Walters moves from a focus on constitutional constraints to the
realm of statutory law, paying careful attention to the ways that the APA’s
procedural protections and prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency
conduct can be used to cabin executive discretion.78 He argues that any means
of limiting the Executive’s enforcement discretion must grapple with the
ubiquity of instances of nonenforcement and the accompanying strains on
judicial capacity that a constitutional cause of action would impose. Walters

73 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1835, 1863-66 (2016) (describing, for instance, the tension between prosecutorial discretion and the
hesitation towards dispensation that are both read into the clause).
74 Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth, Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into
Norms About Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869 (2016).
75 Id. at 1872-73 (investigating “legal limits on a President’s role in shaping action or inaction
by executive branch officials appointed to lead administrative agencies,” limits that take “the form
of either standards or rules”).
76 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-SoUnitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 966 (2001) (arguing that Presidents may influence agencies but
not “dictate substantive decisions”); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007) (urging that the
President is an overseer rather than the decider of actions taken by administrative agencies).
77 See Coglianese & Firth, supra note 74, at 1903-05 (finding that Presidents are seen as
responsible by the public as soon as they become involved, even in an overseer capacity).
78 See Daniel E. Walters, The Judicial Role in Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement Discretion:
The Virtues of an APA Approach, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1911, 1915 (2016) (explaining how courts “‘translate’
constitutional values” through APA review and thus can check executive discretion (footnote omitted)).
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advances review under the APA as a more promising basis for limiting the
use of enforcement inaction than the Take Care Clause.79 Although “arbitrary
and capricious” review is complex, its complexity constitutes its chief virtue,
according to Walters, as it creates jurisdictional safety valves for the courts in
a manner similar to Alexander Bickel’s passive virtues.80 Furthermore, the
ambiguity in practice between agency action and inaction, along with varying
levels of deference as well as the existence of threshold criteria, such as
finality, give the courts the latitude to constrain severely problematic conduct
but to avoid cases that would strain judicial capacity.81
Finally, Professor Adrian Vermeule moves beyond both constitutional and
statutory law to explore the possibility of conventions, or unwritten norms
that are widely regarded as obligatory, as an important source of constraint
on executive discretion.82 Conventions, he argues, constitute a third way of
constraining executive discretion, beyond the use of law or the inherent
constraints provided by politics.83 Law, politics, and conventions may also at
times reinforce each other. Vermeule offers several prominent examples of
conventions as constraints, including those demarcating the independence of
certain governmental actors, such as Commissioners of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Chair of the Federal Reserve Bank, U.S.
Attorneys, the Office of Legal Counsel, and the OIRA Administrator, as well
as limits on the President’s power to direct the decisions of lower executive
officials, particularly those playing adjudicatory roles.84
III. THE FUTURE OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
Both collectively and individually, the articles assembled in this
Symposium offer important new insights about the scope of executive
discretion in the regulatory state and the potential legal avenues for ensuring
that executive power remains properly constrained. We predict that the ideas
presented and analyzed in this Issue will resonate long into the future because
neither presidential power nor the regulatory functions of the federal
government are likely to recede. Furthermore, the public is likely to continue
to hold Presidents responsible for actions taken by officials exercising
79 See id. at 1916 (discussing the value of final agency action as a backstop for courts
unavailable through a freestanding Take Care Clause analysis).
80 See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) (discussing discretion to decline to exercise judicial authority).
81 See Walters, supra note 78, at 1916 (“Allowing courts to selectively review presidential
nonenforcement discretion in turn enables them to carry more authority when they do intervene.”).
82 See Adrian Vermeule, The Third Bound, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1949, 1949 (2016) (explaining
conventions as being “roughly understood as unwritten but obligatory rules of the political game”).
83 Id. at 1954-56.
84 See id. at 1950-53 (using these situations as examples).
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executive discretion. This will mean that Presidents continue to have, in
addition to policy motivations for managing the regulatory state, ongoing
political incentives to pay a considerable amount of attention to both
administrative action and inaction.85
As has been the case in the last several presidential campaigns, we can
expect that, every four years, elections will afford an opportunity for national
deliberation about executive power. Both Democratic and Republican
presidential challengers will no doubt continue to criticize the occupants of
the White House office they seek for abusing their influence over the
regulatory state. Although such partisan charges about presidential overreach
can be expected to continue, there will also always remain a difference
between campaigning and governing. Once successful presidential candidates
assume office, they will continue to find that they face demands they could
never anticipate, and they will then have two basic avenues for meeting those
demands: one avenue will require that Congress adopt new legislation for the
bureaucracy to implement, while the other avenue will involve the bureaucracy
alone, acting on authority already granted to it under existing legislation.
With either avenue, the basic motivations for the exercise of executive
power to command, persuade, or defer will continue to persist. The exigencies
of the nation will call for responses by both Presidents and the government’s
chief administrators. How these officials exercise their executive discretion,
and whether they use it to take action or to deploy strategic inaction, will
undoubtedly determine whether the government succeeds in fulfilling its
responsibility to the public—or whether it fails or, worse still, abuses its
discretion. What counts as an abuse of executive discretion, and how best to
try to prevent those abuses through law, extralegal norms, or politics, will
remain among the most pressing questions at the center of constitutional
governance in the United States.

85 On Presidents’ policy motivations for managing the bureaucracy, see generally RICHARD P.
NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983). The incentives for Presidents to turn to the
management of administrative agencies only increase in periods of divided government and, often,
in Presidents’ second terms. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, The Administrative President, REGBLOG (Jan.
21, 2013), http://www.regblog.org/2013/01/21/21-coglianese-administrative-president/ [https://perma
.cc/J9R6-N2BG] (explaining why President Obama would “find the administrative process much
more amenable to his policy goals in his second term than . . . the legislative process.”).

